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22 
ORIGINALISM AND THE NATURAL BORN  
CITIZEN CLAUSE 
Lawrence B. Solum* † 
Introduction 
The U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 1, provides: “No person except 
a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.” 
The enigmatic phrase “natural born citizen” poses a series of problems for 
contemporary originalism. New Originalists, like Justice Scalia, focus on 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The notion of a “natu-
ral born citizen” was likely a term of art derived from the idea of a “natural 
born subject” in English law—a category that most likely did not extend to 
persons, like Senator McCain, who were born outside sovereign territory. 
But the Constitution speaks of “citizens” and not “subjects,” introducing 
uncertainties and ambiguities that might (or might not) make McCain eligi-
ble for the presidency. 
What was the original public meaning of the phrase that establishes the 
eligibility for the office of President of the United States? There is general 
agreement on the core of its meaning. Anyone born on American soil whose 
parents are citizens of the United States is a “natural born citizen.” Anyone 
whose citizenship is acquired after birth as a result of naturalization is not a 
natural born citizen. John McCain, born to American parents in the Panama 
Canal Zone in 1936, had citizenship conferred by statute in 1937, but there 
is dispute as to whether the statute granted retroactive naturalization or 
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whether it merely confirmed preexisting law under which McCain was an 
American citizen at birth. That leaves John McCain in a twilight zone—
neither clearly naturalized nor natural born. 
I. The Problem Posed by the Natural Born Citizen Clause  
for the New Originalism 
Some constitutional theorists seem to believe that the constitutional text 
provides only loose constraints on the enterprise of interpretation. Consider 
the following analysis of the natural born citizen clause by constitutional 
scholar Michael Dorf, posted at the Dorf on Law blog February 29, 2008: 
[I]f one is not burdened by the label of “originalist,” then [McCain’s eligi-
bility for the presidency] is a pretty easy question. The “natural born 
citizen” requirement manifests a distrust of the foreign-born that, in a na-
tion of immigrants, can only be derided as repugnant. I both “reject” it and 
I “denounce” it! It’s still part of the Constitution, however, and therefore 
we need to try to figure out what it means. My frankly normative move 
would be to limit the damage by limiting the scope of “foreign-born.” 
There’s no plausible way to read the provision to permit Schwarzenegger 
and other naturalized citizens to become President. There is a ready (if not 
100% clearly the original) way to read it to permit Americans born abroad 
to U.S. parents to become citizens. 
Dorf’s comments raise an intriguing question: How would an originalist 
approach the question whether the original meaning of the natural born citi-
zen clause would permit McCain (and others not born of American parents 
on American soil) to become President? To answer that question, we need 
first to understand “originalism” itself. 
Originalism is an evolving family of constitutional theories. Early 
originalist theory emphasized the intentions of the framers or ratifiers, pro-
voking a variety of critical reactions. These criticisms set the stage for what 
is sometimes called “the New Originalism” and is also called “Original Pub-
lic Meaning Originalism.” On June 14, 1986, Justice Scalia gave a speech 
before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties suggesting 
to proponents of originalism that they “change the label from the Doctrine 
of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.” Scalia’s speech was 
the precursor of the view that the “original meaning” of each provision of 
the Constitution is the public meaning of the text at the time it was framed 
and ratified. 
In addition to the shift from original intentions to original public mean-
ing, some New Originalists have embraced a distinction between 
“constitutional interpretation,” the enterprise of discerning the semantic con-
tent or linguistic meaning of the Constitution, and “constitutional 
construction,” tentatively defined as the activity of further specifying consti-
tutional rules when the original public meaning of the text is vague or 
otherwise underdeterminate. When the linguistic meaning of the constitu-
tional text “runs out,” constitutional construction must supplement 
constitutional interpretation. 
The New Originalism played a substantial role in the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. There, the Court invali-
dated a District of Columbia statute that prohibited the possession of 
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useable handguns in the home on the ground that it violated the Second 
Amendment to the Constitution. Given the paucity of precedent on the 
meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms,” Heller offered the Court a 
now-rare opportunity to address the meaning of the constitutional text unen-
cumbered by constraining precedent. The Court reacted by squarely posing 
a question that has exemplary significance for investigations of the relation-
ship between constitutional theory and constitutional: How should courts 
determine the meaning of the Constitution in the absence of controlling 
precedent? 
Writing for the Heller majority, Justice Scalia addressed the issue of 
constitutional method as follows: 
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Consti-
tution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases 
were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.” . . . Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic mean-
ing, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been 
known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation. 
Public-meaning originalism focuses on the conventional semantic meaning 
of the text at the time each constitutional provision was adopted. “Meaning” 
is a notoriously ambiguous term. When we interpret a legal text, we are in-
terested in the “semantic” or “linguistic” meaning—the kind of meaning 
that definitions try to capture—and not the of purpose or implication of the 
text. When we determine “conventional” meanings, we look to patterns of 
usage—as opposed to the intentions of particular authors or speakers. The 
kind of originalism that focuses on conventional semantic meaning, as de-
termined by usage at the time each provision of the Constitution was drafted 
and ratified, can be called “semantic originalism.” 
In many (perhaps most) cases, the inquiry into original meaning can 
proceed clause-by-clause and word-by-word. We determine the conventional 
semantic meaning of each word and then combine the meanings of individ-
ual words into whole clauses using the rules of grammar and syntax. Indeed, 
this is the method people ordinarily use to understand utterances in any 
natural language. But applying this method to the natural born citizen clause 
presents difficulties. The phrase “natural born citizen” seems to have an 
idiomatic meaning that cannot be derived from the conventional semantic 
meanings of the individual words “natural,” “born” and “citizen.” If these 
same words were used in another context, they might distinguish citizens 
who were born naturally from those who were born by Cesarean section. 
Moreover, if the constitution had been adopted more recently, the phrase 
might have referred to citizens whose birth resulted from “nonnatural” 
means, such as artificial insemination or other reproductive technologies. In 
the eighteenth century, the phrase “natural born citizen” seems to have had a 
meaning that cannot be derived from individual word meanings—violating 
the principle of compositionality. The relevant unit of meaning is the phrase 
as a whole. 
The notion that phrases acquire meanings that are not reducible to the 
meanings of the constituent words is familiar to any competent speaker of a 
natural language such as English. We sometimes call such phrases “idioms.” 
Many idiomatic phrases are in common usage and have conventional seman-
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tic meanings that are accessible to most or all competent English speakers. 
But some words and phrases are not familiar to all competent speakers. 
Some of the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional text may be 
“terms of art,” the meanings of which are accessible only to specialized 
readers. Blackstone put it this way in his Commentaries: terms of art “must 
be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and 
science.” 
For example, the phrase “letters of marque and reprisal” (from Article I 
of the Constitution) might not have been familiar to the ordinary citizen 
when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. Such terms of art create a 
potential problem for Justice Scalia’s definition of “normal meaning,” which 
excluded “technical meanings.” If the meaning of the Constitution excludes 
technical meanings, then any terms of art included in the Constitution would 
fail to have any meaning at all and constitutional communication would 
misfire. For example, if the phrase “letters of marque and reprisal” was not 
“known to ordinary citizens in the founding generations,” then that provi-
sion of the Constitution would simply be meaningless—if interpretation 
were limited to “normal meaning.” 
II. Finding the Original Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen” 
How can originalists respond to the problem of constitutional terms of 
art—the use of “technical meanings”? The solution to this problem is to 
recognize a division of linguistic labor, a concept developed by philosopher 
Hilary Putnam. The intuitive idea is simple. When members of the general 
public encounter a constitutional term of art, their understanding of its 
meaning involves a process of deferral. Consider a situation in which an 
ordinary citizen reads the phrase “letters of marquee and reprisal,” and 
thinks, “Hmm. I wonder what that means. It sounds like technical legal lan-
guage to me. If I want to know what it means, I should probably ask a 
lawyer.” This example suggests that ordinary citizens confronted with 
“technical” language recognize a division of linguistic labor, and defer to 
the understanding of the term of art that would be the publicly available 
meaning to those who were members of the relevant group (for example, 
lawyers) and those who shared the understandings of the members of the 
relevant group (for example, other citizens who consulted lawyers about the 
meaning of the term of art). 
How does the division of linguistic labor contribute to our understanding 
of the natural born citizen clause? The phrase “natural born citizen” does 
not have a distinctive sense in contemporary usage by ordinary citizens. Al-
though the individual words that comprise the phrase have conventional 
semantic meanings, it is clear that the meaning of the whole phrase cannot 
be derived from the meanings of the individual words. Of course, it is possi-
ble that the phrase “natural born citizen” would have been familiar to most 
ordinary speakers of American English in the late eighteenth century. But 
suppose this were not the case. The clause nonetheless could have had a 
conventional semantic meaning determined by the linguistic practice of 
those learned in the law in the late eighteenth century—so long as the divi-
sion of linguistic labor made the technical meaning accessible to ordinary 
citizens. 
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Existing scholarship does not reveal extensive usage of the phrase “natu-
ral born citizen” in the founding era, but it was derived from the related 
phrase “natural born subject,” which had a technical meaning in English law 
and constitutional theory. Those learned in the law in the framing era would 
have been familiar with Blackstone’s Commentaries, which James Madison 
described (in the Virginia ratifying convention) as “a book which is in every 
man’s hand.” Blackstone wrote as follows: 
The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-
born subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the domin-
ions of the crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is 
generally called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out 
of it. Allegiance is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, 
in return for that protection which the king affords the subject. The thing 
itself, or substantial part of it, is founded in reason and the nature of gov-
ernment; the name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic 
ancestors. 
. . .  
Allegiance, both express and implied, is however distinguished by the law 
into two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local; the former being 
also perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due 
from all men born within the king’s dominions immediately upon their 
birth. For, immediately upon their birth, they are under the king’s protec-
tion; at a time too, when (during their infancy) they are incapable of 
protecting themselves.  
 . . .  
When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king’s dominions, or 
allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The com-
mon law indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so 
that a particular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, 
for the naturalization of children of his majesty’s English subjects, born in 
foreign countries during the late troubles. And this maxim of the law pro-
ceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance 
where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two mas-
ters, at once. Yet the children of the king’s ambassadors born abroad were 
always held to be natural subjects: for as the father, though in a foreign 
country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; 
so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of postliminium) to 
be born under the king of England’s allegiance, represented by his father, 
the ambassador. To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by 
statute 25 Edw. III. st. 2. that all children born abroad, provided both their 
parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the king, and the 
mother had passed the seas by her husband’s consent, might inherit as if 
born in England: and accordingly it hath been so adjudged in behalf of 
merchants. But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still 
farther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king’s ligeance, 
whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects 
themselves, to all intents and purposes, without any exception; unless their 
said fathers were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or 
were then in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain. 
SOLUM FI  FTP3 M.DOC 9/30/2008 8:53 AM 
2008] Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause 27 
 
Blackstone’s understanding of the notion of a “natural born subject” is 
not completely clear or precise. On the one hand, he states “[n]atural-born 
subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of 
England,” but on the other hand, he suggests “all children, born out of the 
king’s ligeance, whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-
born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes.” The latter statement 
might be considered a modification of the first, but the use of the qualifying 
language “to all intents and purposes” could be read as suggesting that chil-
dren born to British subjects abroad were granted the rights of natural born 
citizens, but were not actually “natural born” themselves. For most practical 
purposes, this fine distinction is irrelevant because the common-law rule 
could be overruled by statute. However, when this distinction is applied to 
the natural born citizen clause, it might become important because statutes 
cannot overrule the Constitution. 
Blackstone’s understanding derived from the common law, which seems 
to have originated in Calvin’s Case, a decision of the Court of Common 
Pleas, reported by Lord Coke in 1608. Writing in his 1914 article Natural 
Born British Subjects at Common Law in an English law journal, F.B. 
Edwards summarized the complex and difficult opinion: 
The question before the Court [in Calvin’s Case] . . . was whether Robert 
Calvin, the plaintiff, a Scottish Subject of King James I., who was born af-
ter James’s accession to the English throne, was an alien; the unanimous 
finding of the judges was that he “was no alien . . . .” It is important to re-
member that at the time when that case was decided the feudal or 
territorial conception of nationality was practically universal throughout 
the world; or, at least, that that conception was operative in both England 
and Scotland as far as the acquisition of the local nationality at birth was 
concerned. 
The concept of allegiance to the sovereign at birth (as noted by Blackstone), 
then, was the fundamental criterion for who was—and was not—a natural 
born subject. The notion of natural born subjects under British law was tied 
to the idea of natural allegiance to a sovereign. Natural allegiance was based 
primarily on being born within the territory subject to the sovereign’s rules. 
But it could also be based on being the children of Ambassadors or children 
of Sovereigns themselves: members of these groups were considered to have 
a natural allegiance to the sovereign. 
What conception of territory, then, underlies the English conception of a 
natural born subject? Edwards’s answer suggests that such territories are 
limited to the “sovereign’s dominions”: 
There is little difficulty in deciding whether any particular territory forms 
part of the King’s Dominions. It is quite clear that British Protectorates, 
whether ordinary or colonial, and spheres of influence are not included 
within the King’s Dominions, and that a right to occupy and administer 
vested in the British Government does not make British the territory af-
fected. 
Nor do the Indian allied states come within the boundary of the British 
Empire. There seems, however, no reason, beyond a purely technical one, 
why territories held by the British Crown under what either is, or practi-
cally is, a lease in perpetuity, should be excluded from this limit. The 
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proposition that British Protectorates, and consequently any less interest of 
the Crown, should be excluded from our definition of the King’s protec-
tion, is supported by Sir William Anson, who declares that birth within 
such a region is not sufficient to found a claim for British natural-born sta-
tus. The real test of whether a given territory is part of the British 
Dominions is that it must have passed openly, completely, and unequivo-
cally into the possession of the Crown. 
If the American conception of “natural born citizen” were equivalent to the 
English notion of a “natural born subject,” then it could be argued that only 
persons born on American soil to American parents would have qualified. 
This might lead to the conclusion that McCain would not be a natural born 
citizen under the Constitution because the Panama Canal Zone was not the 
sovereign territory of the United States but was instead merely subject to 
U.S. administrative control. On the other hand, the notion of a natural born 
subject might have been more flexible, encompassing all those who ac-
quired citizenship at birth (as opposed to those whose citizenship was 
conferred after birth by “naturalization”). 
So far we have assumed that the conventional meaning of “natural born 
citizen” for those learned in the law in the eighteenth century was equivalent 
to the meaning of “natural born subject” in nineteenth century English law. 
But is this assumption correct? Does the substitution of the term “citizen” 
for “subject” alter the meaning of the phrase? And if those learned in the 
law did recognize a difference, what implications does that have for the 
meaning of the natural born citizen clause? 
The language of the Constitution recognizes a distinction between “citi-
zens” and “subjects.” For example, Article III, section 2 differentiates 
“citizens” of the several states from “citizens” or “subjects” of foreign 
states. In the framing era, these terms reflected two distinct theories of the 
relationship between individual members of a political community and the 
state. In feudal or monarchical constitutional theory, individuals were the 
subjects of a monarch or sovereign, but the republican constitutional theory 
of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period conceived of the individ-
ual as a citizen and assigned sovereignty to the people. 
The distinction between citizens and subjects is reflected in Chief 
Justice John Jay’s opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, the first great constitu-
tional case decided after the ratification of the Constitution of 1789: “ [A]t 
the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly 
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . .” 
Justice James Wilson confirmed Jay’s articulation of the opposition between 
subjects and citizens. Wilson noted that with the exception of Article III, the 
Constitution refers to “citizens” and “persons,” not subjects: “The term, sub-
ject, occurs, indeed, once in the instrument; but to mark the contrast 
strongly, the epithet ‘foreign’ is prefixed.” Both Jay and Wilson’s opinions 
suggest that usage in the founding era reflects a significant conceptual dis-
tinction between the words “subject” and “citizen”. The term “citizen” 
reflects the notion that individual citizens are sovereign in a republic, whe-
reas the term “subject” reflects feudal and monarchical conceptions of the 
lord or monarch as sovereign and the individual as the subject. 
This conceptual distinction may be relevant to the original understand-
ing of the American constitutional phrase “natural born citizen,” which was 
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used instead of the English legal phrase “natural born subject.” The notion 
of a natural born subject may reflect a feudal understanding of political ob-
ligation: Those born in the kingdom owed a natural duty of allegiance to 
their king and were his natural subjects. Given a republican theory of popu-
lar sovereignty, citizens are sovereign, and the notion of a “natural born 
subject” would be anathema. This leaves a gap in the theory of citizenship—
a gap that the Constitution fills with the concept of a natural born citizen. 
One interpretation of the new term of art, “natural born citizen,” is that 
its content is identical to the content of the old phrase, “natural born sub-
ject,” with the purely nominal difference in the term (“citizen” versus 
“subject”) used to refer to members of the political community. This could 
result in the interpretation suggested above—which would limit natural born 
citizens to persons born of American parents on American soil. 
Those leaned in English law, however, understood another aspect of the 
concept of “natural born subject.” Children of the sovereign were natural 
born subjects wherever their birth occurred. The issue of the king owed a 
natural obligation to their father; likewise, the children of the king’s ambas-
sadors were deemed to owe a similar obligation to their parents’ monarch. 
But in republican theory the people are sovereign, suggesting that the repub-
lican conception of natural born citizens would naturally treat the children 
of citizen-sovereigns as equivalent to the children of a monarchical sover-
eign or king. This understanding may have been reflected in the first 
naturalization act of 1790 “An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturali-
zation,” which provided “the children of citizens of the United States, that 
may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be 
considered as natural born citizens.” Because the First Congress passed this 
act, it arguably reflects the original understanding of “natural born citizen” 
as encompassing those born of the citizen-sovereigns on foreign soil. On 
this interpretation, John McCain would be a natural born citizen of the Unit-
ed States (at least for the purposes of eligibility for the presidency) because 
the original meaning of that phrase includes all persons born to American 
citizens. 
On the other hand, the language of the 1790 Act might be interpreted 
differently. The statute is not explicitly phrased in declaratory terms: The 
phrase “shall be considered as natural born citizens” might have reflected 
the understanding that the children of American citizens on foreign soil 
were not actually “natural born,” but could be treated as if they were by 
granting them a legal status that was otherwise identical to that held by 
those who were “natural born.” On this interpretation, McCain would not 
qualify as a natural born citizen even if a statute had conferred citizenship 
upon him at birth. Such a conclusion is based on the conventional and wide-
ly shared assumption that Congress lacks power to alter the meaning of the 
Constitution through legislation. 
From the point of view of originalist method, the question is how to re-
solve the conflict between these two interpretations of the clause. The New 
Originalism suggests that the object of our inquiry should be the linguistic 
practices of the relevant groups—either citizens at large or those learned in 
the law in the eighteenth century. The ambiguity could be resolved if evi-
dence of usage confirms one of the readings suggested above—or, as may 
be the case, it establishes some other, slightly different meaning. 
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III. The Possibility of Irreducible Ambiguity 
The analysis so far has suggested that the original meaning of the phrase 
“natural born citizen” may be ambiguous, or that evidence of that meaning 
may be insufficient to resolve the ambiguity introduced by the passage of 
more than two centuries. Most originalists assume that constitutional ambi-
guities can usually be resolved by reference to the original public meaning 
in context. But what does originalism say about ambiguities that cannot be 
resolved in this way? What if the original meaning is itself ambiguous or if 
there is insufficient evidence to resolve an ambiguity? 
It is at this point that “New Originalists,” such as Keith Whittington and 
Randy Barnett, might suggest that “interpretation runs out,” and a different 
modality of constitutional practice must be engaged—this is what New 
Originalists call constitutional construction. Although New Originalists 
agree on original public meaning as the correct account of constitutional 
interpretation, they disagree about the best approach to constitutional con-
struction. Randy Barnett’s distinctive theory of constitutional legitimacy 
sanctions a justice-enhancing account of constitutional construction. Keith 
Whittington has emphasized deference to democratic political processes. 
Jack Balkin suggests that construction should be guided by reference to the 
purpose of the constitutional provision at hand. Different approaches to con-
stitutional construction might give different answers to the question whether 
McCain is eligible for the presidency. 
Conclusion 
The phrase “natural born citizenship” is semantically inaccessible to 
modern readers. Because this phrase violates the rule of compositionality, it 
must be understood as an idiom or term of art. For this reason, gleaning the 
meaning of the phrase requires us to investigate linguistic practice to recover 
the original meaning—the meaning of “natural born citizen” at the time of 
constitutional utterance. When we look for public meaning, we may dis-
cover that the division of linguistic labor in the late 18th century takes us to 
the shared understandings of those learned in the law. We may need to look 
to eighteenth century linguistic practice to make sense of a phrase that 
would otherwise be either mysterious or radically ambiguous. For this rea-
son, the natural born citizen clause may illustrate what we might call the 
“inescapability of originalism”: Some constitutional provisions only make 
sense after we turn our attention to the way language was used when they 
were framed and ratified. There is good reason to believe that the natural 
born citizen clause is one of these provisions. 
But, from the fact that originalism is inescapable, it does not follow that 
originalism answers all constitutional questions. Grasping the original 
meaning of the natural born citizen clause may lead us to the conclusion that 
the constitutional text does not provide the answer to all of our questions 
about eligibility for the office of President. Constitutional practice may re-
quire both interpretation and construction: The original public meaning of 
the natural born citizen clause may not suffice to answer the question 
whether John McCain is eligible for the office of President of the United 
States. 
